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The SPS Agreement as a Bottleneck in
Agricultural Trade between the European
Union and Developing Countries: 
How to Solve the Conflict
Denise Prévost and Mariëlle Matthee*
1.  Introduction
It is crucial that developing country concerns regarding the Agreement on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (hereinafter the SPS
Agreement) urgently be addressed in the WTO in order to ensure that these
countries experience the full benefits of trade. There has been much talk
that the new negotiating round in the WTO, which was launched in Doha,
will be a Development Round.1 To ensure the success of the new round,
reforms are necessary in sectors of importance for developing countries in
order for these Members to perceive the advances in trade liberalisation as,
on balance, advantageous to them. On the other hand, for reforms to be agreed
upon they have to take account of the interests of developed country Members,
such as the European Community, which are often in conflict with those of
developing countries, particularly in sensitive sectors.
The agricultural sector is pivotal in this regard as many developing
countries’ economies rely on agricultural trade as a primary source of foreign
revenue. However, this sector is subject to a great deal of protectionist measures
in the EC and elsewhere. Clearly, progress towards removal of these traditional
trade barriers (such as subsidies and tariffs) can be undermined by the use
of health regulations to block entry of imports. Thus, in order to ensure
real market access for agricultural products, the ongoing reform process for
agricultural liberalisation in the WTO, as mandated by Article 20 of the
Agreement on Agriculture (hereinafter the AoA), must go hand in hand with
reforms to the SPS Agreement. This fact is not only evinced by the close
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1. This new terminology was stated to be intended to signal a different set of priorities in the
negotiations. The Doha Ministerial Declaration specifically states that Members seek to place
the needs of developing countries at the heart of the Work Programme adopted therein (see
Ministerial Declaration, Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, hereinafter the Ministerial
Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1 at para. 2).
link between these two agreements during their original negotiation in the
Uruguay Round, but also by the fact that most negotiating proposals in the
context of the mandated agriculture negotiations contain some reference to
SPS concerns. A recent study by the FAO2 points to the fact that trade in
agricultural products is still hampered by non-tariff barriers, including health
regulations. Thus, despite the existence of disciplines contained in the SPS
Agreement, countries continue to block access to their agricultural markets by
means of SPS measures.3 This has particularly harsh consequences for
developing countries, many of which rely on a small number of agricultural
exports. They view SPS measures as often creating unjustified non-tariff
barriers to their agricultural and food exports. 
The EC constitutes the main export market for developing country agri-
cultural products and liberalisation of its agricultural industry is therefore
crucial for developing countries. Influenced by a series of events directly or
indirectly related to the protection of public health, such as the outbreak of
mad cow disease, the Belgian dioxin scandal and the French blood-transfer
case, European consumers lost trust in the governors of the European
Communities. Therefore re-establishing consumer confidence is one of its
major concerns at this moment. Consequently, its trade policy is greatly
influenced by public opinion and the ‘non-trade concerns’ under the mandated
negotiations on the AoA are high on the agenda.4
While it is clear that most Members see a need to review certain aspects
of the SPS Agreement it is not yet established in what context such review
would occur. If the SPS Agreement itself is not reopened for negotiation in
the context of the new round,5 it is possible that these concerns will continue
to be addressed in the context of the ongoing agriculture negotiations, as
has been the case to date.6 The reference in Article 14 of the AoA to the
SPS Agreement opens the door for this possibility, as does the identification
of market access (thus including non-tariff barriers such as SPS measures)
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2. FAO, 1999, Symposium on Agriculture, Trade and Food Security: Issues and Options in the
Forthcoming WTO Negotiations from the Perspective of Developing Countries, 23–24 September
1999, FAO: Geneva at 3.
3. In a communication during the Seattle preparatory process, India noted that ‘as standards are
emerging as one of the major non-tariff barriers to the market access of developing countries,
it is imperative that they be speedily rationalised . . .’ (see WT/GC/W/108 at para. 19).
4. These non-trade concerns focus mainly on food safety issues such as GMO labelling, the
application of the precautionary principle and consumer concerns and animal welfare. See
G/AG/NG/W/90.
5. It should be noted that no Member has formally asked that the SPS Agreement be reopened
for negotiation during the new round. In fact the US has indicated that it will not support
such reopening (see G/AG/NG/W/15 at 2). However, the possibility that this may change at a
later stage in the negotiations cannot be excluded.
6. For example, see G/AG/NG/W/136 at 4; G/AG/NG/W/97 and Corr. 1 at 2 and
G/AG/NG/W/94 at 2.
as one of the ‘three pillars’7 of the ongoing agriculture negotiations and the
already mentioned explicit reference in Article 20 to ‘non-trade concerns’ as
one of the elements to be taken into account in the mandated negotiations.
Developed Members, such as the European Communities, have little to gain
from increased disciplines on their ability to enact SPS measures unless they
can use such concessions to exact trade benefits in other sectors of interest
in the context of a comprehensive round. On the other hand, concerns have
been expressed that these trade-offs would allow powerful Members, on whose
agricultural product markets developing countries depend, to exact a price
for the tightening of SPS disciplines from developing countries in unrelated
sectors.8 Another possibility is to make use of the mechanism that exists in
Article 12.7 SPS of the SPS Agreement, which allows for review of the
operation and implementation of the Agreement to take place in the SPS
Committee, which can then make proposals for amendments to the Council
for Trade in Goods.9 Certain aspects of the SPS Agreement have already
been addressed in the Implementation Decision adopted in the Doha
Ministerial, which was seen as a down-payment for developing countries at
the start of the new Round.10
To establish what are the conflicting concerns with regard to the SPS
Agreement, one must thus turn to the proposals made in the context of the
agriculture negotiations. In addition, a few proposals made in the context
of the Seattle preparatory process and the implementation discussions in the
General Council are relevant here. This paper will not attempt to provide a
comprehensive discussion of all problems raised by developing countries and
the EC regarding the SPS Agreement, but focus on a few central concerns.
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7. The other two pillars are export competition and domestic support.
8. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Board, 1999, TD/B/COM.1/EM.8/2 at para. 29.
9. The first review of the SPS Agreement under Article 12.7 (1998–1999) did not result in any
recommendations for amendment of the text and it was agreed in the SPS Committee that any
Member could propose amendments at any time for consideration in the Committee. (While
concerns regarding the implementation and operation of the Agreement have been raised in SPS
Committee meetings, there have been no specific proposals for amendments. On the other hand,
the SPS Committee has adopted a decision on equivalence under its powers in terms of Article
12.1 SPS to facilitate the implementation of Article 4 SPS (see WTO SPS Committee 2001
Decision on Equivalence, G/SPS/19).)
10. See WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, 2001, Decision on Implementation-Related
Issues and Concerns, WT/MIN(01)/W/10 (hereinafter the Implementation Decision) at para. 3.
The question of the status of this decision is interesting as it cannot be regarded as an author-
itative interpretation of the relevant articles of the SPS Agreement as the procedure in Article
IX.2 WTO was not followed. Panels and the Appellate Body are likely to take it into account
in interpreting the relevant articles of the SPS Agreement as a “subsequent agreement” under
Article 31.3(a) of the Vienna Convention but in doing so they may not add to the obligations
contained in the SPS Agreement. 
2.  Differing focus: market access vs. non-trade concerns
In the first phase of the mandated agriculture negotiations, many formal
negotiation proposals contained references to SPS concerns.11 Those of
developing countries mainly addressed SPS issues in the context of their market
access concerns, although there were a few proposals which also looked at
the impact of the Agreement on non-trade concerns, such as food safety
and consumer concerns.12 From an examination of these proposals it thus
appears that the primary focus of developing countries with regard to the
SPS Agreement is on the extent to which it can assist them in obtaining
real market access for their agricultural and food exports. Issues of food
safety take secondary place and are most prominent in those developing
countries that are net importers of agricultural products.13 On the other hand,
the primary focus in the EC proposals is on non-trade concerns, such as
food quality and animal welfare.14
The reason for the developing country focus on market access is obvious.
As was the case during the Uruguay Round negotiations, in the current
negotiations Members realise that the hard-won progress made towards
liberalisation of the agricultural sector by increasing disciplines in the areas
of export competition, market access and domestic support is meaningless
without disciplines to prevent Members replacing their traditional protectionist
measures with non-tariff barriers such as the imposition of standards or
regulations for the protection of human, plant or animal life or health. The
disciplines of the SPS Agreement aim to address this problem.
The proposals indicate that there are two main areas of concern that
developing countries have with regard to the effectiveness of the SPS
Agreement in preventing SPS measures from becoming unjustified barriers
to trade (and thus in guaranteeing market access). The first area of concern
relates to the flexibility inherent in the SPS disciplines themselves, particu-
larly with regard to the possibility of taking precautionary measures under
Article 5.7 SPS and of deviating from internationally harmonised standards
Denise Prévost and Mariëlle Matthee
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11. A summary of the proposals in the second phase of the agriculture negotiations can be found
in a Secretariat briefing document which refers to only two proposals relating to SPS issues,
those of Japan and the ECs (see WTO Information and Media Relations Division, 2001, WTO
agriculture negotiations: The issues, and where we are now at 26–27).
12. See for example the proposal of Korea in G/AG/NG/W/98 at 5.
13. The proposal from Mauritius indicates that Small Island Developing States (SIDs) are mostly
food deficit countries and suggests that SIDs’ inability to carry out detailed risk assessments (as
required by the SPS Agreement) should not prevent them from denying entry of certain products
into their territories (see G/AG/NG/W/96 at 5).
14. See G/AG/NG/W/90.
as provided for in Article 3.3 SPS.15 This first category of concerns stands
in contrast with the non-trade concerns of the EC, which would require
flexibility in the existing SPS provisions. Secondly, developing countries widely
express the concern that the lack of implementation by developed Members
of provisions in the SPS Agreement enacted to take account of the special
constraints faced by developing countries means that they continue to be
confronted with insurmountable hurdles in the form of stringent SPS stan-
dards on their export markets, without being given assistance to comply
with them. Although until recently the EC granted technical assistance related
to SPS capacity building to several developing countries on a rather ad hoc
basis, it is about to launch important technical assistance to all ACP (African,
Caribbean and Pacific) countries to comply with the EU sanitary and phy-
tosanitary rules.16 This might indicate a turning point in the EC policy on
special and differential treatment of developing countries.
These two areas of concern will now be discussed in more detail and
explained in the context of the existing SPS Agreement.
2.1.  Flexibility inherent in SPS disciplines
The disciplines contained in the SPS Agreement aim at achieving a balance
between the sovereign right of Members to impose measures for the protec-
tion of health in their territories and the need to liberalise trade in agriculture
and food products. For this reason, they allow some flexibility for national
governments in their regulation of health in their countries. It is the degree
of this flexibility that gives developing countries cause for concern. They
see this flexibility as eroding the strength of the disciplines and creating the
possibility of abuse for protectionist purposes. On the other hand, the EC
expresses its need for such flexibility in order to satisfy its consumer’s concerns.
One of the disciplines contained in the SPS Agreement is the obligation
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15. Additionally, the flexibility in the provisions on equivalence (Article 4 SPS) and the recogni-
tion of disease-free areas (Article 6 SPS) was raised as a problem. Although these provisions are
mandatory, the lack of clear guidelines for implementation made these obligations difficult to
enforce and little had been done by way of implementing these provisions. Developing coun-
tries accused developed Members of refusing to recognise disease-free areas even when officially
recognised as such by the relevant international organisations and of requiring ‘sameness’ instead
of equivalence (see G/SPS/GEN/128 at 1). On 24 October 2001, the SPS Committee (using
its competence under Article 12.1 SPS) approved a decision on equivalence, aimed at facilitating
the use of Article 4 SPS (see WTO SPS Committee 2001 Decision on Equivalence, G/SPS/19).
The status of this decision is worth examining. Like the Implementation Decision, it does not
comply with the requirements for an authoritative interpretation or an amendment of the SPS
Agreement (Articles IX.2 and X WTO). Due to constraints of space, this issue will not be
discussed further here, but its importance should not be underestimated.
16. See G/SPS/GEN/244, pp. 4 and 5, Indicative list of projects.
to base SPS measures on internationally harmonised standards17 unless the
stricter measures can be scientifically justified by means of a risk assess-
ment.18 The promotion of harmonised standards by the SPS Agreement has
the potential of going a long way towards reducing the non-tariff barriers faced
by developing country products by ensuring that the SPS measures imposed
reflect internationally accepted standards (rather than arbitrary and unrea-
sonably stringent standards) and that products face the same requirements
on all export markets. 
The loopholes created in the harmonisation provision by the possibility
for (scientifically justified) deviating measures are seen by developing coun-
tries as undermining these potential benefits. Developing countries do not
have the technical capacity and expertise to challenge SPS measures that deviate
from international standards on grounds of lack of scientific justification.
Further, since scientists often disagree on issues of risk and a risk assessment
does not have to embody a majority view,19 much scope is left for Members
to impose more stringent SPS measures than those embodied in interna-
tional standards. This diminishes the harmonising effect of Article 3 SPS
and thus the benefits thereof for increasing market access for agricultural
and food products. 
This room to manoeuvre is, however, necessary in the view of the EC. If
all countries are obliged to stick to international standards, there is fear that
a downward movement of standards will result. Often the EC already has high
standards in place at the time international standards are negotiated. Thus the
obligation to accept international standards would most probably paralyse
the standard-setting process, as the EC would in that case have every interest
in obstructing the development of a new international standard, which
contains a lower level of protection than its own. As regards the minority
opinion of scientists, this is seen by the EC as one of the main ways to
ensure the application of the precautionary principle during the risk assess-
ment procedure. In their opinion, the inclusion of minority views in the
risk assessment reports must be assured, especially in the case that the minority
opinion draws attention to scientific uncertainty.20
The SPS Agreement further disciplines Members’ use of SPS measures
by requiring that such measures be based on scientific principles (in the
form of a risk assessment).21 This obligation ensures that SPS measures address
a real, objectively established, health risk and are not protectionist measures
Denise Prévost and Mariëlle Matthee
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17. Article 3.1 SPS. 
18. Article 3.3 SPS as interpreted by the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones (see WT/DS26/B/R at
para. 175).
19. See the Appellate Body report in EC-Hormones (WT/DS26/B/R at para. 175). This finding has
been criticised for opening the door for the use of ‘hired scientists’ by governments to justify
their measures (see D.E. McNiel, 1998 Virginia J of Int’l L 39: 89–134 at 134.)
20. See G/SPS/GEN/225, G/TBT/W/154, G/CTE/W/181, at 3. 
21. Article 2.2 SPS read together with Article 5.1 SPS.
disguised as health regulations. However, an exception to this obligation is
provided for in Article 5.7. Article 5.7 allows for provisional SPS measures,
based on available pertinent information, in cases where scientific evidence
is insufficient, provided that a Member seeks to obtain additional informa-
tion for a more objective risk assessment and reviews the measure within a
reasonable period of time. 
The allowance made in Article 5.7 for precautionary measures gives
developing countries cause for concern. The terms used in Article 5.7 are
rather vague and undefined. It is not clear what would constitute ‘pertinent
information’ sufficient to justify a provisional measure, how long such a
measure may be maintained while keeping its character as ‘provisional’ or what
the obligation to ‘seek to obtain . . . additional information’ entails.22 This
creates the possibility that insufficiently justified measures could be maintained
for long periods of time. 
In order to respond to European consumer concerns and to regain their
confidence, the EC pays special attention to the use of the precautionary
principle. There is public concern that the WTO can be used to force onto
the market products for which there is a reasonable suspicion that they might
be unsafe. Under the precautionary principle, the EC can provisionally adopt
measures to protect human health, when there is a legitimate reason to believe
that the product in question may contain risks but insufficient information
exists to identify them. It is therefore a useful instrument for the EC to respond
to public concerns. In its communication on the precautionary principle,
the European Commission has indicated that in its opinion the provisional
nature of a measure should not be determined by time restrictions, but rather
be delineated by the development of scientific knowledge.23
Due to the flexibility inherent in the language of these provisions, devel-
oping countries have proposed that the disciplines in the SPS Agreement be
tightened. In particular, some proposals have suggested that all Members
should be obliged to apply internationally harmonised SPS standards that
reflect the constraints faced by developing countries. A clarification of the
requirements of Article 5.7 by means of concrete guidelines indicating under
which conditions a provisional measure may be applied has also been sug-
gested. Aware that the precautionary principle is to a certain extent reflected
in Article 5.7, and that misuse and legal uncertainty should be avoided,
there is a need for clarification on the use of the precautionary principle,
the EC has developed several documents in which they explain their approach
towards its use. In addition, they have repeatedly called for further clarifica-
tion on this issue.24
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22. The Appellate Body took some steps towards the clarification of two of the requirements of
Article 5.7 in Japan – Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/AB/R, paras. 92–93.
23. See G/SPS/GEN/168.
24. See G/AG/NG/W/90, at 4.
2.2.  Lack of consideration for developing country constraints
The SPS Agreement provides for special and differential treatment (S&D treat-
ment) of developing country Members and for the provision of technical
and financial assistance, in order to take into account the special constraints
that these Members face due to their economic and developmental situations.25
In particular, in Article 9 SPS, Members agree to ‘facilitate the provision of
technical assistance to other Members, especially developing country Members’
in order to allow them to adjust to and comply with SPS standards in their
export markets.26 This assistance can take the form of ‘advice, credits, dona-
tions or grants’. Where compliance with the SPS measure would entail
‘substantial investments’ by a developing country, the importing Member ‘shall
consider’ providing the technical assistance necessary for the developing
country Member to maintain or expand its market access opportunities for
the relevant product.27 Article 10 SPS obliges Members to take developing
country Members’ special needs into account in the preparation and appli-
cation of SPS measures.28 Further, it provides that Members ‘should’ accord
longer time-frames for compliance with new SPS measures on products of
interest to developing country Members, where the appropriate level of SPS
protection allows,29 and that they ‘should’ encourage and facilitate active
developing country participation in the international standard-setting bodies.30
Paragraph 2 of Annex B SPS obliges Members to allow a ‘reasonable interval’
between the publication of an SPS measure and its entry into force to allow
producers ‘particularly in developing country Members’ to adapt to the new
measure ‘(e)xcept in urgent circumstances’. The examination of these provi-
sions shows that many of the S&D treatment provisions contain no binding
obligations beyond a ‘best endeavour’ commitment, or are qualified in a
way that makes evasion easy.
Developing countries argue that the flexible language of these provisions
creates no enforceable obligations and thus allows developed countries to
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25. There are two types of S&D treatment provisions in the WTO Agreements, namely (1) time
limited derogations (such as longer transition periods) and (2) clauses providing for specific,
though undefined, action by developed countries when dealing with developing countries. As
the second category is most problematic, this paper will limit itself to this type of provision (see
WT/GC/W/108 at paras. 5–7).
26. Article 9.1 SPS.
27. Article 9.2 SPS.
28. Article 10.1 SPS.
29. Article 10.2 SPS.
30. Article 10.4 SPS.
disregard them. The inadequacy of the implementation31 of these provisions
is a common complaint of developing countries and has been raised in the
framework of the implementation discussions in the General Council32 and
in the Seattle preparatory process as well.33 There is a clear need for the
operationalisation of S&D treatment and there have been many calls for the
strengthening of these rules.34
While many developing country proposals in this regard merely refer, in
general terms, to the need for consideration of their special situation, tech-
nical and financial assistance to meet SPS standards and assistance for their
participation in international standard-setting (thus implying that the current
rules do not effectively provide for these needs),35 other proposals are more
specific and expressly state that Articles 9 and 10 must be made mandatory
for developed country Members.36 In addition, some proposals suggest the
laying down of specific time frames for the imposition of new measures37
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31. That is not to say that no technical assistance relating to SPS concerns has been delivered
at all. In fact several Members have submitted papers to the SPS Committee documenting
the technical assistance they have provided to developing countries (see G/SPS/GEN/181;
G/SPS/GEN/143; G/SPS/GEN/143/Rev.1/Add.1; G/SPS/GEN/78; G/SPS/GEN/124;
G/SPS/GEN/244). What remains a concern is the inadequacy of the technical assistance given
thus far to overcome the barriers to developing country products created by stringent SPS
standards (see G/SPS/GEN/85 at 4). 
32. The Decision on Implementation adopted at the Doha Ministerial Declaration on the basis of
these discussions refers to implementation concerns regarding S&D treatment and mandates the
Committee on Trade and Development to examine the possibility of making non-mandatory
S&D provisions binding as well as other ways of improving the effectiveness of these provisions,
and to report to the General Council with recommendations in this regard by July 2002 (see
the Implementation Decision at para. 12). This work programme is endorsed in the Ministerial
Declaration (see the Ministerial Declaration at para. 44). 
33. See, for example, WT/GC/W/108 at para. 16.
34. In an earlier response of the LDC Coordinator to the Draft Ministerial Declaration, it is pointed
out that it is not sufficient to provide technical assistance to help developing countries under-
stand WTO rules and implement their obligations. Instead, technical assistance must go further
and address supply side constraints (see the Statement of the Coordinator of LDCs on the Draft
Ministerial Declaration, 2 October 2001 at 6). An example of such a constraint would be the
inability to comply with SPS standards due to lack of technical capacity, expertise and infra-
structure. The informal paper on implementation of a group of seven Members suggests that
all S&D treatment provisions be converted into concrete commitments, ‘especially to address
the constraints on the supply side of developing countries’ (see the Group of Seven Implementation
Paper 2001 at 8–9).
35. See for example G/AG/NG/W/136 at 4 and G/AG/NG/W/37 at 6 & 7.
36. See for example G/AG/NG/W/142 at 3 and Group of Seven Implementation Paper 2001 at 3. It
should be noted, however, that some or parts of the provisions which these proposals suggest
be made mandatory (e.g. Article 10.1 and Annex B para. 2) are already mandatory, but
difficult to enforce due to loopholes and flexible language. 
37. See Group of Seven Implementation Paper 2001 at 3. 
and the creation of specific procedures38 to be followed to ensure that devel-
oping country constraints are taken into account.39
The Implementation Decision40 adopted in Doha addresses SPS-related
concerns with regard to S&D treatment. The Decision is a compilation of
proposals from developing countries, the ‘Group of Seven’41 and the ‘Quad’
Members. In particular, the Decision stipulates time frames that were previ-
ously left open and sets some procedural rules for Articles 10 and 12.7.42
3.  Evaluation of developing country proposals and suggested 
3. amendments of the SPS Agreement
The developing country proposals discussed above address significant problems
faced by these countries regarding the effectiveness of the SPS Agreement
in ensuring market access for their agricultural and food exports. Reforms
are clearly needed to prevent evasion of the SPS disciplines by misuse of the
flexibility inherent in the Agreement to impose unjustified measures. At the
same time, it is necessary to ensure that developing countries receive the
technical and financial assistance as well as special treatment they need in order
to prevent legitimate SPS measures from constituting barriers to their export
markets. 
On the other hand, it is important to ensure that these two goals are met
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38. See G/AG/NG/W/97 at 2; G/AG/NG/W/100 at 5 and WT/GC/W/108 at para. 16.
39. A couple of interesting and very concrete proposals were made in this regard in the context of
the Seattle preparatory process (see WT/GC/W/374 at para. 16 and WT/GC/W/108 at paras.
16 & 18).
40. See the Implementation Decision WT/MIN(01)/W/10 at para. 3. This decision was drawn up
and adopted separately from the Ministerial Declaration, which decision was criticised by some
developing countries as potentially leading to the downplay of the importance of implementa-
tion issues (see the Statement of the Coordinator of LDCs on the Draft Ministerial Declaration, 2
October 2001 at 1).
41. See Group of Seven Implementation Paper, 2001.
42. According to the Implementation Decision, the ‘longer time-frame for compliance’ under Article
10.2 SPS must be understood to mean normally at least 6 months. Where no phased in intro-
duction of a new SPS measure is possible and specific problems with the measure are identi-
fied by a Member, the Member imposing the measure must enter into consultations to find a
mutually satisfactory solution while continuing to achieve the Member’s appropriate level of
protection. Further, it provides that the ‘reasonable interval’ under Annex B para. 2 must be
understood to mean normally at least 6 months, taking into account that the timeframes for
specific measures must be considered in the context of the particular circumstances of the measure
and actions necessary to implement the measure. Further, that the entry into force of SPS
measures that contribute to trade liberalisation should not be unnecessarily delayed. The Decision
also proposes that review of the Agreement under Article 12.7 take place at least once every 4
years and that the Director-General continue his cooperative efforts with international standard-
setting organisations to facilitate participation of Members at different levels of development
(see the Implementation Decision, WT/MIN(01)/W/10 at para. 3).
without disturbing the delicate balance aimed at by the SPS Agreement
between the objective of ensuring market access for food and agricultural
products and the sovereign right of governments to protect the life and
health of humans, plants and animals in their territories. It goes without saying
that both developed and developing countries have an interest in being able
to act to address health risks in their territories, in a manner that reflects
their national health priorities. 
It seems that any workable solution to achieve an appropriate balance
between the two aims of the SPS Agreement would involve guidelines further
specifying the flexible provisions, which are largely concentrated in Article 5.7
and Article 3.3 SPS, coupled with a framework for effective technical and
financial assistance and stricter rules on special treatment. Some tentative
suggestions will be made along these lines, as a basis for further discussion.
Firstly, the loophole created in the scientific disciplines by Article 5.7 should
be clarified. It is clear that scope for the application of provisional measures
is necessary to deal with the realities of scientific uncertainty in risk regula-
tion. This is not a new phenomenon and it is common practice for countries
to act quickly in the face of a threat to health, without waiting for the results
of risk analyses. However, this should not be allowed to become a catch-all
provision for all measures lacking a scientific basis. It is therefore important
that binding guidelines be drawn up that further define the conditions under
which precautionary measures may be taken. In addition, the use of Article
5.7 should be limited to safety concerns and should not cover the ethical
concerns of the consumers. Often these concerns are interrelated. Since ethical
concerns can be considered legitimate, more attention should be paid to the
clarification of other provisions under the WTO Agreements (mainly GATT
Article XX, the TBT Agreement or under the negotiation process of Article
20 AoA) that could cover trade measures aiming to respond to these concerns.
It is suggested that the proposed guidelines make clear that the applica-
tion of Article 5.7 is only triggered where ‘scientific evidence is insufficient’
due to the urgency of the measure, which made waiting for the results of a
risk analysis unfeasible or due to gaps in existing scientific knowledge (for
example regarding the long-term effects of GMO release into the environ-
ment). This would not be the case where scientific evidence exists, but does
not support the measure.43 The ‘reasonable period of time’ before such a
measure must be reviewed should be specified44 (for example at 6 months)
with the provision that a Member maintaining the measure for a longer period
without having obtained additional evidence to support a proper risk assess-
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43. For example as was the case with the EC’s ban on hormone-treated beef in the face of risk
analyses showing the hormones to be safe if administered according to good veterinary practice
(at issue in EC-Hormones WT/DS26/AB/R). 
44. See the report of the Appellate Body in Japan-Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/AB/R at para.
93.
ment bears the burden of proving why such additional time is necessary and
why a risk assessment could not be performed in this period. These amend-
ments would tighten the provisions of Article 5.7 and ensure that they are
only used for legitimate purposes. While tightening the provisions, atten-
tion should be paid to preventing developing countries from becoming victims
of these restrictions in future. The lack of scientific, technical and financial
resources make it difficult, if not impossible, for them to apply the precau-
tionary principle themselves. Defining a time limit that is too restricted, while
allowing no budgetary or political justifications for longer periods, might
eventually do more harm than good to developing countries.45
Secondly, it would be useful to tighten the flexibility resulting from the
wording of Article 3.3. Tightening it as far as obliging all Members to adopt
international standards is to be rejected, as these standards represent a com-
promise agreement on a minimum level of protection and such an obligation
would be contrary to the acknowledged sovereign right of governments to
decide on the appropriate level of protection to be applied in their territo-
ries. In addition, the paralysis of the standard-setting procedure that would
result in the postponement of the adoption of standard, or even no adoption
at all, would have negative consequences for developing countries in partic-
ular. As developing countries often do not have standards in place,
international standards provide them with a certain degree of protection. They
also set a benchmark against which other countries’ standards can be chal-
lenged. 
However, a reformulation of this provision to indicate that deviation must
always be based on a risk assessment would be useful to avoid the confusing
impression created by its wording that there are two possibilities for the
justification of deviating measures.46 Further, the provision could be amended
to oblige developed country Members that impose stricter measures than those
reflected in international standards to promptly notify their intention to
impose such measures,47 respond to all comments received regarding the
measure and, to the extent that the measure has a negative impact on exports
from developing countries, provide technical and financial assistance to enable
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45. It is interesting to note that in the framework of the Biosafety Protocol, the majority of
developing countries and the European Union were in favour of the inclusion of the precau-
tionary principle. In their opinion, however, the precautionary principle needed to be backed-
up by the adoption of a liability regime. Some developing countries expressed that such a regime
could give a certain guarantee which is in their opinion necessary as the WTO rules restrict in
particular the countries with limited scientific and technical expertise to justify their import
restrictions based on the precautionary principle (Summary of the Fifth Meeting of the Open-
ended ad hoc Working Group on Biosafety: 17–28 August 1998, Earth Negotiations Bulletin,
IISD, Vol. 9, no. 108, 31 August 1998, p. 12). 
46. The Appellate Body stated in EC-Hormones that ‘Article 3.3 is evidently not a model of clarity
in drafting’ (see WT/DS26/AB/R at para. 173).
47. See the arguments of India (WT/GC/W/108 at para. 18).
these countries’ producers to meet the new standard.48 In this way, technical
and financial assistance will be directly linked to the measures encompassing
a higher level of protection and the need of developing countries resulting
therefrom. Such an obligation will ensure that Members do not lightly deviate
from an international standard and, in cases where they are convinced that
such deviation is necessary, that they take responsibility for the effects of
the deviation on developing country exports. 
Even though it does not go as far as obliging all Members to adopt inter-
national standards, the suggested amendment would, of course, increase once
again the importance of the standards set on international level. With this
shift, the concerns related to the democratic and effective functioning of
standard-setting bodies become more important and need to be evaluated.
At present, despite initiatives of the standard-setting organisations in this
regard, developing country participation in the international standard-setting
process leaves much to be desired. They do not have the resources to attend
the plethora of committees (often hosted by developed countries) that prepare
the standards and they thus often limit their participation to the plenary
session where the proposed standards are adopted. Although developing
country participation in plenary sessions is increasingly active, at this late stage,
the concerns they raise cannot be adequately addressed nor compromises
reached and the resulting absence of consensus prevents the adoption of any
standard. Clearly this result is contrary to the interests of developing coun-
tries in extending the harmonisation for standards as much as possible. The
last meeting of the Codex Alimentarius Commission49 clearly illustrated this
problem. The possibility that this untenable situation may lead to a movement
away from consensus decision-making in standard-setting organisations is also
worrying as the standards adopted would lose their legitimacy as interna-
tionally accepted norms. It is thus of the utmost importance to ensure effective
participation of developing countries in all stages of the standard-setting
process. 
The provision in Article 9 SPS stating that Members ‘should’ encourage
and facilitate the active participation of developing countries in these organ-
isations has not been effective. What is needed are not meetings with
developing countries during which they are encouraged to support the position
of the developed country involved, but rather effective technical and finan-
cial assistance to developing countries to enable them to identify and promote
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48. This follows the proposal by the group of eight developing countries during the Seattle prepara-
tory process mentioned above, but limits its application to SPS measures that deviate from
international standards (see WT/GC/W/374 at para. 16). It also corresponds to the suggestion
by the Coordinator for LDCs in the response written on the Draft Ministerial Declaration, for
the inclusion of an agreement to provide technical and financial support to LDCs before the
introduction of new SPS measures which adversely affect LDC exports (see Statement of the
Coordinator of LDCs on the Draft Ministerial Declaration 2001 at 8).
49. The 24th Session of the Codex Alimentarius Commission was held in Geneva on 2–7 July 2001.
their own interests. To ensure that no strings are attached to such assistance
and that it is supplied in a secure and predictable manner, it would be best
if it were administered by the WTO itself on the basis of funding from the
regular (but increased) WTO budget, which is contributed to by all Members
according to their share in world trade.50 In this way, financial support could
be given for developing country delegates to attend all meetings,51 for training
programs for such delegates and for coordination with their national min-
istries.52
Additionally, while the WTO cannot prescribe to other international
organisations how they should conduct their activities, it may decide for
itself which of the standards adopted by such organisations it will regard as
relevant for its purposes. In this context, the definition of ‘international
standards, recommendations and guidelines’ in Annex A SPS needs to be
looked at closely, in order to differentiate between the various types of instru-
ments used by international standard-setting organisations, and reconsider
whether they should have the same status under the SPS Agreement. For
instance, at this moment food safety standards developed by the Codex
Alimentarius would have the same status as its general principles once they
are adopted,53 whereas the function of the instruments is quite different.
Lastly, it is necessary to address the issue of time frames for imposition
of and compliance with new or stricter SPS measures. As stated above, fixed
time frames under Article 10.2 and Annex B paragraph 2 would lead to the
untenable situation that Members could not prevent the inflow of even dan-
gerous products and proposals to set fixed time frames should therefore be
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50. It would seem logical for this fund to be set up and administered by the international standard-
setting organisation itself. However, the WTO has no say over the activities of these organisa-
tions and cannot oblige them to take such a step. Nor do their members have any obligation
to contribute to a fund on the basis of a WTO decision. The added relevance of the standards
set by these organisations is due to the reliance thereon by the SPS Agreement and the problems
caused thereby are therefore an issue that the WTO should deal with. It is, however, possible
that an agreement could be reached between the WTO and each standard-setting organisation
in which the standard-setting organisation agrees to take over these duties.
51. This is already done by the OIE, which has a fund from which developing country delegates’
costs for attending the plenary sessions are met.
52. The need for technical assistance to be secure and predictable was recognised in the Doha
Ministerial Declaration and the Budget Committee was instructed to develop a plan ensuring
long term funding for WTO technical assistance for adoption by the General Council in
December 2001 (see Ministerial Declaration WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1at para. 40). In its first
meeting on this issue the Committee considered a proposal by the Director-General to create
a Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund, financed by voluntary contributions coupled
with a monitoring mechanism to ensure timely and predictable funding. Some Members raised
concerns regarding the voluntary nature of the funding, arguing for financing from the WTO’s
regular budget (see Bridges, 40(5), 28 November 2001 at 4). 
53. The SPS Committee responded to the question from the Codex Alimentarius Commission on
the status of Codex texts by saying that the SPS Agreement did not establish any distinction
between different types of Codex texts directed to governments, ALINORM 99/33, paras. 50–52.
rejected. The Implementation Decision contains a more flexible specifica-
tion of the time frame for phased introduction of a measure under Article
10.2 SPS as ‘normally a period of not less than 6 months’, coupled only
with a consultation obligation ‘with a view to finding a mutually acceptable
solution’ that maintains the importing Members appropriate level of protec-
tion, where phased introduction is not feasible.54 This may lead to a
continuation of the situation as it now stands, where no effort is being made
to identify situations where such delayed compliance would be feasible. It is
thus proposed that the recommended period for compliance by developing
countries (which could be left at 6 months) be coupled with a shift of the
burden of proof to the Member applying the new measure without allowing
for delayed compliance to indicate reasons why this additional period could
not be allowed. In this way, the starting point would be the granting of a
longer compliance period to developing countries which could not be avoided
by mere consultations, but the additional period would not be required
where an unacceptable health risk would result. An analogous solution could
be applied to the time frame for the coming into force of new measures
under Annex B paragraph 2 to replace the ‘normally a period of not less
than 6 months’ interpretation laid down in the Implementation Decision.55
4.  Conclusion
It is not the purpose of this article to cover all aspects of the SPS Agreement
that need to be addressed in order to accommodate developing country
concerns, but merely to make a few suggestions that could form a starting
point for further discussion and more concrete proposals for reform. It is hoped
that by contributing to the discussion on possibilities for reform of the SPS
Agreement, further steps can be taken towards reaching a solution that both
addresses the legitimate concern of developing countries to ensure that the
SPS Agreement’s disciplines result in tangible benefits in terms of market access
for their agricultural and food products, and the equally important goal of
ensuring that Members’ ability to protect health within their territories is
not compromised. It is clear that reforming the SPS Agreement cannot stand
by itself, but comes with amending in conjunction the relevant provisions
of other WTO Agreements and the functioning of the relevant international
standard-setting bodies.
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54. Implementation Decision WT/MIN(01)/W/10 at para. 3.1.
55. Implementation Decision WT/MIN(01)/W/10 at para. 3.2. Here the 6-month time frame is
qualified by a requirement that the circumstances of the measure and the actions necessary for
its implementation be taken into account. These considerations, as well as the further provi-
sion that trade liberalising SPS measures should not be unnecessarily delayed, should be main-
tained. 
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